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There is an old saying that when you have a hammer, everything looks like a
nail. It could mean that when you have a certain tool handy, it seems like the
best tool for every task. Or, it could mean that when you have a tool, everything looks like a problem that needs to be fixed. Whatever else it means,
though, it surely means that the tools we have at our disposal influence the
way in which we solve problems. Sometimes we use a hammer when a pry
bar, a mallet, or a nail puller would be better.
This is a book about tools, the tools that we use to judge the moral acceptability of laws and policies regulating health and the various practices of
health care. What makes a law a good one? What makes a behavior deserving of regulation, incentivization, or prohibition? What should laws aim
at? When do laws go too far? Answering these questions requires tools, or
methods. It is crucially important that we use the right tool for the job when
answering questions like these. I will argue that bioethics has not been using
the right tools when answering questions such as these. It has tended to use
the tools it has available rather than the best ones for the job.
The tools that I am primarily concerned with in this book are philosophical ones. The discussion about methods in bioethics is a relatively big and
multifaceted one: bioethics is inherently interdisciplinary, and so there is no
single set of tools applicable to all, or perhaps even any, bioethics problems
or issues. Even the questions I listed above are not solely philosophical questions. When we ask whether a behavior should be regulated or prohibited,
for example, sociology and the medical sciences might be relevant. In fact, it
might be harder to list disciplines not relevant to these questions than it would
be to make a list of those that are. Everything affects everything; how can any
tool be the “wrong one” for the job, if we need so many tools to get a grasp
on the moral problems we face in real life?
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It would be foolish to bring only the tool you thought most important for a
job to the task; you should bring a whole tool bag because for any problem,
you may need more than one tool. Even so, there is often one or a small set
of tools that are most important for the job at hand. My argument is, roughly,
this: despite the large number of tools bioethics has brought to problems of
health law and policy, it has generally failed to bring the most important
one: political philosophy. The argument is about philosophical tools because
I understand moral problems to be, at base, best answered by philosophical
tools. These philosophical tools are commonly employed in the bioethics literature, where a significant percentage of the field is made up of professional
philosophers. But the problem is that bioethicists have typically brought (to
use another hackneyed saying) knives to a gunfight. They have used the
principles, theories, and methods characteristic of moral philosophy when
they should have been using political philosophy.1 This has had a detrimental
effect on the quality of the substantive answers bioethicists have given to
normative questions surrounding health law and policy; and in many cases
it has also caused debate to revolve around issues that are, I shall argue, not
the most relevant to the problems for which they are thought foundational.
Defending these sweeping claims raises methodological problems of its
own. Even if it were true, that bioethics has tended to use moral philosophy
when political philosophy would be more appropriate, what sort of method
could be used to demonstrate this? The claim is clearly an empirical one—
bioethics only has a “problem” if we look at the bioethics literature and
find that political philosophy is indeed missing. How could such a thing be
accomplished in any kind of rigorous way?2 But these sweeping claims also
raise serious normative and philosophical issues. Who decides what the most
important discipline is for addressing any particular question? Isn’t the idea
that political philosophy is the “best” tool for some job itself a normative
claim? How would we even know if political philosophy were used enough?
Wouldn’t the answer to such a question depend, in part, on answering questions about which moral and political theory is the right one?
The book is in fact designed around these questions. To give a spoiler:
there is no rigorous way to make the claim I am making. That is why I will
have to combine broad characterization of the literature with specific, pointed
examples, that I think are strong but are still, ultimately, only suggestive.
Readers will have to judge for themselves whether the examples are compelling enough to demonstrate a problem with the field. Furthermore, there is no
definitive way to explain the role that political philosophy should play in the
bioethics literature without assuming a normative standpoint. That is why—
after some broad observations of the field in chapters 1 and 2—I will stick
to evaluating the bioethics literature from a specific normative standpoint,
namely, a Kantian one. But the reasons for bringing Kant into this debate
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are, ultimately, related to showing the broader problem with the bioethics
literature. Using moral instead of political theories for answering normative
questions about health law and policy is a problem from many standpoints,
although it is particularly problematic from a Kantian standpoint, as Kant
himself made a great effort to demonstrate, I shall argue. But Kantian bioethicists have not generally considered the theoretical problems with trying to
enforce Kantian morality; nor have they paid any attention to Kant’s political
philosophy, or any competing political philosophy; and what is more, they
haven’t been challenged to do so by their critics. This overall state of affairs
is among the most damning evidence possible, I will argue that there is a
problem with the field. If anyone should be employing political philosophy,
and specifically a theory of government legitimacy, for practical problems it
should be Kantian bioethicists. But instead of paying close attention to the
conceptual issues with enforcing Kantian morality, or trying to apply the principles specifically developed by Kant for issues of law and policy, Kantian
bioethicists have taken the same approach toward matters of law and policy
that other bioethicists have: they justify laws and policies by appealing to
principles and duties characteristic of moral philosophy, rather than by giving
an account of the role and legitimate function of the government.
THE BOOK
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The book will proceed in two very unequal parts. In the first and shorter part
of the book (essentially chapters 1 and 2), I will make the case that political
philosophy has been underrepresented in bioethics. In this part of the book
the argument I make is mostly empirical and can be summarized by three
major points. The first two occur in chapter 1. First, I argue that bioethics is,
and always has been, oriented toward questions of law and policy—arguably
the larger part of the discipline has been aimed at questions relating to law
and policy, and has not been content with mere discussion of what behaviors are “moral” or “immoral.” Even the principles most closely associated
with bioethics were originally adopted in the context of pressing problems
in health law and policy. My claim then is that bioethics has always been in
practice a kind of applied political theorizing, since the questions bioethicists
sought to answer were so often legal or regulatory ones. Even clinical bioethics depends in a very significant way on conclusions about the normative
justifiability of laws and policies. Then I will discuss in a very abstract way
the methods that would seem to be most appropriate to answering questions about the normative justification of laws and policies. What kinds of
premises would be necessary to decide, for example, whether some action
should be legally mandated, incentivized, or prohibited? This leads us to the
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second major point: premises about government are necessary for justifying
any normative claim about health law or policy. Treating issues of law and
policy as mere questions about the morality of the behaviors they regulate is
problematic, because such an approach necessarily relies on premises about
government that are rarely even articulated, let alone defended as part of a
broader theoretical perspective.
The third major point in this first part of the book appears in chapter 2.
Despite the field’s aspiration to give arguments justifying health law and
policy; and, despite the formal importance of normative theories about
government to this project; political theory plays only a very small role in
bioethics. The reasons for the absence of political philosophy in bioethics can be understood by studying the context in which the field emerged.
Understanding that context sheds some light on why the major approaches
present in the bioethics literature today have systematically marginalized theories of government and exposes some common but problematic assumptions
these major approaches make about how law and policy should be justified.
Political philosophy is nearly absent from major works on bioethics methodology, and the methods that these works have established has meant that it is
also missing in most other areas of the field. We can see this by examining a
variety of introductions to bioethics and general works on bioethics and law,
for example. The argument is not that political philosophy is entirely absent
from bioethics, but that it is severely underrepresented when considered in
light of the political goals of the field and the wide (although by no means
universal) enthusiasm the field shows for using philosophy as a method for
justifying normative claims.
The second part of the book (chapters 3–8) will make a more sustained
case for the inclusion of political philosophy in bioethics by using Kantian
moral and political philosophy to give a detailed account of the problems with
the dominant approach to normative justification of health law and policy,
and the ways in which a political philosophy can solve them. This part of the
book, with the exception of chapter 3, is mostly normative. In chapter 3, I
survey a variety of ways that bioethicists have approached the question about
whether markets in organs should be legally prohibited. I focus specifically
on Kantian approaches to this question. This makes a comprehensive survey
of the literature more feasible, but it also offers important insight about the
way bioethicists approach questions of health law and policy. In that chapter
I show how, despite a rich theoretical literature exploring multiple aspects
of Kantian philosophy and applying it in diverse ways to the question of
the legalization of organ markets, almost no attention has been given in that
literature to basic questions about political philosophy, such as the conditions
for legitimate laws, or the moral justification for the exercise of political
power. This is perplexing because Kant himself devoted much attention to
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these issues in his political philosophy, developed in several of his works
not often utilized in the bioethics literature. Instead, bioethicists have almost
universally preferred to utilize Kant’s moral philosophy to answer questions
about the basic justifiability of laws prohibiting the sale of organs. In this
way, they reflect the “moral philosophy approach” dominant in the bioethics
literature, by which I mean that they determine the justifiability of laws and
policies by using moral philosophy to determine whether the actions regulated are moral or immoral.
In chapter 4, I give a detailed account of the theoretical problems with this
moral philosophy approach to issues of health law and policy. To do this, I
give an account of the main problem associated with justifying specific health
laws or policies (the problem of political legitimacy). I show why there is
no easy way to solve the problem of legitimacy if we are limited to familiar
moral principles described in Kantian moral philosophy. Although bioethicists in the literature on Kant and organ markets have thought that Kantian
moral principles can explain either why we should or should not have legal
prohibitions on organ sales, a careful study of Kant’s moral philosophy shows
that such uses Categorically misunderstand Kantian moral philosophy. The
various versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative cannot easily justify any
uses of political power, because for Kant moral duty is primarily about acting on the right reasons, and laws and policies have no way of causing us to
do this. In fact, far from solving the problem of political legitimacy, Kant’s
Categorical Imperative actually presents three serious challenges for justifying political legitimacy, and so threatens to show that law and policy cannot
be justified at all. The challenges presented by a careful reading of Kant’s
moral philosophy leave us in need of a dedicated account of the moral justification of exercise of political power—in other words, a normative political
philosophy.
Fortunately, Kant provides such an account in his Doctrine of Right. In
chapters 5 and 6 I develop an account of political legitimacy and authority
along the lines of Kant’s account in the Doctrine of Right, and argue that it
solves the challenges that his familiar moral principles, taken by themselves,
cannot. In chapter 5 I argue that Kant shows how the exercise of coercion
is morally justified by the possibility of it being exercised in a manner consistent with the external freedom of everyone under universal law. Kant’s
account of the basic case of justified coercion helps solve some of the problems set up in chapter 4 but leaves others outstanding. In chapter 6, I argue
that Kant provides the resources for answering these remaining challenges in
his accounts of private and public right and I show how he does so. Notably,
I also argue here that Kant’s political philosophy is actually necessary for
plausibly applying his moral philosophy to many moral, rather than political,
questions. A theory of political rights of the kind Kant provides turns out to
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be a necessary precursor to answering basic questions about whether actions
use persons as a mere means, on my account.
In chapters 7 and 8, I explore some ways in which political philosophy—in
this case, the Kantian one I developed in chapters 5 and 6—might change the
bioethics debate surrounding two significant legal issues in bioethics. These
chapters illustrate some ways that significant issues and questions have been
overlooked in the bioethics literature because it has utilized methods of moral
philosophy, rather than more appropriate methods characteristic of political
philosophy. These chapters are important for understanding the fundamental
rethinking of various bioethics issues that normative political philosophy
can offer us.
In chapter 7, I rethink the contribution Kant makes to questions about the
legal permissibility of markets in organs. While chapter 3 shows how Kant
is usually interpreted as supporting laws prohibiting the sale of kidneys, his
basic political principles suggest that governments actually lack the authority
to legally prohibit such sales. This is true even though such sales are deeply
immoral, on his view. However, Kant’s theory also provides reasons for
thinking that the state cannot legitimately enforce contracts for kidney sales.
I argue, then, that the considered Kantian position on such markets is that they
must be legally permitted, although contracts for kidneys are unenforceable.
The stark contrast between “Kantian” accounts based on his moral views,
and the most defensible position based on his political ones, illustrates the
importance of political philosophy for justifying law and policy. Laws that
seem easily justified by their role in enforcing “morality” may turn out to be
deeply unjustifiable when considered more carefully in light of the principles
defining and limiting the legitimate exercise of political power.
In chapter 8 I rethink the basis of informed consent laws. Bioethicists have
typically utilized the moral philosophy approach here as they have elsewhere,
thinking that laws requiring informed consent must be justified on the basis
of our general moral rights. But they have failed to justify informed consent
laws, I argue, because they have not been able to explain why general prepolitical rights to consent entail that physicians (alone among parties seeking
to obtain consent) have special duties to inform patients about the risks and
benefits of treatment. The Kantian political approach is different, because
it starts with the presupposition that our prepolitical moral rights are indeterminate. So although patients have a basic moral right to consent, nothing
specific follows from this about how much information physicians must give
patients in order to obtain a valid consent. Physicians consequently have no
specific prepolitical duties to inform patients prior to treating them. However,
Kant understands this condition of indeterminate prepolitical rights and
duties as deeply morally problematic, and it forms the basis of his account
of government authority. The government exists in part to solve the problem

	Introduction

7

ks

on

ly

of indeterminacy and give content to our prepolitical moral rights, as part of
its general mandate to make us equal under law. Because the government has
authority to determine the specific contours of, for example, the physician’s
duties when obtaining consent, it can endow physicians with both a moral
and legal duty to inform patients about the benefits and risks of treatment as
a condition for obtaining a valid consent. In this case, political philosophy is
not only necessary for determining the nature of our political rights and obligations, but also for giving shape and content to our moral duties.
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As I’ve said, the primary purpose of this book is to argue for reconsidering
the importance of political philosophy or political theory to bioethics. I argue
that bioethics should use principles explaining the legitimacy of governmental actions when justifying laws or policies. However, some readers may be
skeptical about the importance of theory in general (moral or political) for
bioethics. If theory in general is not a legitimate or important way of treating
bioethics issues, then it may seem misguided to suggest that political philosophy has an important role to play in the justification of law and policy. Other
readers may think theory is important, but question the relevance of specific
kinds of theories, such as the kind of Kantian theory I’ve indicated will be
employed in this book.
Critics have had a variety of motivations and have questioned the use
of theory in bioethics in different ways. Some writers—such as casuists—
have been skeptical about the use of theory in moral reasoning altogether.3
Obviously, if theory should not play a significant role in moral reasoning,
then arguments about “what kind” of theory we should employ in bioethics
will lose much of their interest. In this book, I make the modest assumption that moral and political theorizing is sometimes valuable for bioethical
reasoning.
Even granting this modest claim, some may object that theory is nevertheless a liability in certain contexts. For example, Will Kymlicka argues against
the use of theory on governmental commissions, in part because there is limited time in this context to engage in extensive theorizing.4 John Arras, similarly, argues against the use of theory in the public policy context, because
the more “theoretical” the work is, the less likely that it can be understood
by the general population, and so the less likely that it can be endorsed in a
meaningful way by the electorate from which laws get their authority in a
democratic society.5
The argument in this book, however, is not for the use of theory in any particular context. The argument is instead a qualitative one: it is about the kind
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of theory that should be employed when we engage in theory, not an account
about when we should engage in it. If there are certain contexts where overt
theory is not appropriate—as there likely are—then political philosophy
should not be used in those contexts, but neither should moral theory. The
argument here is best understood in a hypothetical sense: if theory is ever
justified in bioethics reasoning about law and policy, then it is political rather
than moral theorizing that deserves pride of place. The argument in chapter 1,
that normative claims about laws and policies presumably must rely on some
account about what governments should generally do, should be taken in this
way. It may not always be appropriate for bioethicists to explain the more
general premises about morality or political legitimacy that lead to their conclusions about law and policy; but if they do, it is indefensible to explain only
the relevant moral premises, and not the (even more) relevant political ones.
KANTIAN THEORY
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A different set of concerns has been leveled not at the context of theoretical work, but instead at the kinds of theories employed. Specifically, some
have argued against the use of “high moral theory,” particularly theories of
the kind traditionally studied in normative ethics, such as Kantian or utilitarian theories.6 Various concerns about these theories are raised, including
their “architectonic” nature (meaning that they usually depend on one or a
few foundational principles—which, if wrong, would seem to invalidate the
whole theory), and the background pluralism that makes appeal to such theories controversial, or even morally objectionable. In some ways, it is possible
to read the whole field of bioethics as a response to the problem of pluralism
about morality and the necessity of finding commonly acceptable solutions to
moral problems. I explore this reading of the field in chapter 2.
From this perspective, it may seem like appeals to Kantian moral or political philosophy rest on a very significant misunderstanding of bioethics and
its tasks in the real world. On this view, bioethics exists to present commonly
acceptable answers to our public problems, not to further divide us by appealing to controversial or outdated theories.
However, part of the argument of this book is that we have lost something in the move away from the use of “high” moral and political theory.
Specifically, I argue in chapter 2 that bioethics moved toward mid-level principles—such as, for example, Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of
biomedical ethics—as a practical way of avoiding some of the controversy
that threatened to undermine bioethics deliberation in the pluralistic context of health care. However, the move to mid-level principles unwittingly
focused attention on what I call “primary moral duties,” that is, moral duties
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ordinary persons have toward one another. Because of the focus on these primary moral duties, bioethicists have predominantly considered issues of law
and policy through that lens: not as questions about the duties and rights of
governments, but instead as questions about the duties of professionals (or in
some cases, citizens or patients). Conclusions about these are then translated
directly into law or policy.
The problems with this approach are best seen by taking a step back and
considering, abstractly, whether an account of these primary moral duties
is sufficient for justifying either law or policy. I argue that it is not, but the
argument is necessarily theoretical. For example, in order to consider whether
showing that something is immoral is enough to show that it should also be
illegal, we have to consider what it means for something to be “immoral” in
the first place. Kantian theory is employed in part because it makes a commitment about major concepts explored here, such as “morality,” “coercion,”
“legitimacy,” and more.
I caution readers against what would, in my view, be a serious misreading
of this book. Some readers may be tempted to read this as merely a “Kantian
political account” of bioethics. This book does provide the outlines of such
an approach, but I will spend relatively little time defending Kant’s particular political philosophy against competing political approaches (although, I
do provide an extensive argument about why Kant’s political philosophy is
preferable to his moral philosophy when addressing issues of law and policy).
The main argument of the book is that bioethics should use political philosophy when justifying health law and policy, and I employ Kant’s moral and
political theory as a way of showing what is at stake and why it is important.
Kant is particularly helpful for this project because he provides a detailed
and thorough account about the principled distinctions between moral obligation and political legitimacy. Much of the potential audience for this book
does, I suspect, self-consciously reject Kantian moral theory for one reason
or other. As we will discuss in some detail (especially in chapter 5), the main
principles of Kantian political theory are not directly dependent on his moral
principles, even though they are compatible with them. So I encourage readers to approach Kant’s political theory with an open mind, even if they reject
Kant’s moral theory. But even if readers have reasons for rejecting both his
moral and political theory, I think this book still has something to offer them:
it is a book about the importance of normative political philosophy, and not
just a Kantian political bioethics.
Because the main purpose of the book is to reflect on the relationship
between morality and law, and to consider the reasons why political theory is
more suited to addressing health law and policy problems than moral theory,
it is important to regard the normative policy conclusions of chapters 7 and
8 somewhat tentatively. In both chapters, I draw normative conclusions
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about policy on the basis of Kantian arguments about the source and nature
of government legitimacy and authority. I believe that these conclusions are
relatively better justified than other positions on these issues in the extant
literature. However, part of the reason why Kant’s theory is relatively successful here compared to the existing bioethics literature is that few authors
in bioethics are even addressing the relevant questions in these applied
cases—namely, questions about the source, nature, and limitations of the
state’s legitimacy and authority. If we had a more robust literature beginning with these questions rather than questions about our moral duties, then
Kantian political philosophy could be put into fruitful exchange with other
views about government legitimacy and authority, and we might find (methodologically appropriate) reasons for thinking that the Kantian positions I
develop are wrong. If there ever comes a day when the bioethics literature
engages more extensively with these issues from competing views about the
legitimacy and authority of the government, then perhaps there will be occasion to revisit the normative conclusions of these chapters.
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1. By “moral philosophy” from here forward, I mean the branch of philosophy that
develops theories that are meant to assess our most basic duties toward each other.
By “political philosophy,” I understand theories specifically designed to address questions about what makes government “just or legitimate or good” (see the discussion
in chapter 1). On some accounts—including perhaps the Kantian one, as I discuss in
chapter 5—political philosophy should be understood as a branch of moral philosophy. Even so, in this book I argue that the problems raised in attempting to justify
governments and their laws go well beyond the more basic ones about our duties to
each other that are the bread and butter of moral philosophy. As such they require
additional explanation about concepts such as legitimacy and authority, even if political philosophy is ultimately best understood as a branch of moral philosophy broadly
construed. This distinction between moral and political philosophy also underlies
Kant’s approach. In some works, such as the Groundwork, the Critique of Practical
Reason, and the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant is most concerned with explaining our basic
duties to one another. In others—most significantly, the Doctrine of Right, but also
in his occasional works, such as “Theory and Practice,” and “Towards Perpetual
Peace”—Kant discusses issues related to government legitimacy and authority.
2. For a discussion of the value but also limitations of this kind of work, see
Rosalind McDougall, “Systematic Reviews in Bioethics: Types, Challenges, and
Value,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39, no. 1 (2014).
3. Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), 333.
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4. Will Kymlicka, “Moral Philosophy and Public Policy: The Case of New
Reproductive Technologies,” in Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, ed. L W
Sumner and Joseph M Boyle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
5. John Arras, “Theory and Bioethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta (2020). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/
theory-bioethics/.
6. John Arras, “Theory and Bioethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta (2020).

